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Lefler: A Response from the Author

A RESPONSE FROM THE AUTHOR
ROBERT A. LEFLAR*

My first reaction is that I have learned a lot from the presentations, not just about conflict of laws, though I have learned a
good deal about conflict of laws during the last hour or two. But
I have learned, or at least heard, a lot about myself that I did not
know before. I am not sure what I know now.
I must express keen appreciation to the members of the panel
for everything they have said, especially those parts of their remarks which have made me begin to rethink some of my former
thoughts. I am going to be brief but will refer to a few points about
which one panelist or another has asked me to say something.
I. NEW

YORK CHOICE-OF-LAW CASES

To begin with, I may have attached more importance than I
should to Rosenthal v. Warren.' I gather from what Professors
Rosenberg and Juenger have said that I was wrong in taking it at
face value. I started my study of that case on the assumption that
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was doing what it said it was
doing, that is, attempting to figure out what the New York law
is, as represented by Neumeier v. Keuhner2 and prior cases. I
thought that the Second Circuit was making an honest effort to
determine what the New York Court of Appeals would say, as
Erie3 and Klaxon v. Stentor4 require that the federal court of
* Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Arkansas; B.A., 1922, University of
Arkansas; LL.B., 1927, S.J.D., 1932, Harvard University. Author, AMERCAN CONFICTS
LAW (3d ed. 1977).
1. 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1973). For a similar New York state-court case, see Tjepkema
v. Kenney, 31 A.D.2d 908, 298 N.Y.S.2d 175 (1969).
2. 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972). In Neumeier, a New York
automobile host was sued for the death of his Ontario guest in an Ontario accident caused
by the ordinary negligence of the defendant host. The holding was that Ontario's hostguest statute, rather than New York's ordinary-negligence rule, should govern. New York
was deemed to have no governmental interest in applying its plaintiff-protective rule in
favor of an Ontario plaintiff against the New York defendant. Rosenthal v. Warren, 475
F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1973), in contrast, involved an action against a Massachusetts surgeon
for the wrongful death in Massachusetts of a New York resident. The conflict was between
the Massachusetts law's top limit on death recoveries and New York's no-top-limit rule,
and the holding was that New York's plaintiff-protective rule was to be applied in favor
of the New York parties. Cf. Trautman, Rule or Reason in Choice of Law: A Comment on
Neumeier, 1 VT. L. Ray. 1 (1976).
3. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
4. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
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appeals sitting on a New York case must do.' Perhaps they were
not doing what Erie and Klaxon v. Stentor called on them to do,
though I thought they were. I am almost persuaded by what I
have heard tonight, that Rosenthal v. Warren is not a New York
case after all; I had thought it was.
At any rate, we do have a situation in which some of us have
thought that the New York law, represented by the Neumeier
holding in favor of a New York defendant, and Rosenthal v.
Warren, purporting to apply the same New York conflicts law, on
essentially similar facts in favor of a New York plaintiff, did
indicate an apparent correspondence of New York's governmental
interests with the interests of the local boys. I hope we can agree
that this is wrong whether it represents the present New York
conflicts law or not. My earlier criticism of the New York cases
was based on a belief that this wrongness was inherent in them.6
A case that reached a result exactly opposite to Neumeier,
and which I think deserves our approval, is Johnson v. Spider
Staging Corp.7 In it, the Washington court applied Washington
plaintiff-protective law (no top limit on wrongful-death damages,
as against a Kansas $50,000 top limit) against a Washington defendant in favor of a Kansas plaintiff for a Kansas tort. There was
no problem with reference to the due process clause and legislative jurisdiction; Washington had plenty of contacts with the
case, but Kansas also had plenty of contacts. If the Washington
court had applied the approach which was used in Neumeier v.
5. See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAw 126 (3d ed. 1977).
6. The effect [of the two New York cases] was that, with reference to an
extrastate tort involving a nonresident and a New York party, the New Yorker,
whether plaintiff or defendant, would win in each case on the analysis that New
York's governmental interest favored its own citizens. An argument might be
made that this amounts to a denial of equal protection of the laws to nonresident
persons within the jurisdiction. At least it contradicts the ideal of a state's legal
system as a repository of justice for residents and nonresidents alike, an ideal
which should inhere in the governmental interests of any state. Unwillingness
to take account of the better rule of law as a choice-influencing consideration
seems strange indeed in the light of this preference for the litigant who is locally
regarded as the "better party" because his home is in the forum state.
It seems that New York's law of choice of law, currently more unsatisfactory
than that of any other state that has moved away from lex loci delicti and
similar old rules, will have to be further modified, as undoubtedly it will.be,
before it can fairly be listed among the states that have achieved a reasonable
flexibility under modem conflicts theories.
Leflar, Choice of Law: A Well-Watered Plateau, 41 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 10, 20-21
(Spring 1977).
7. 87 Wash. 2d 577, 555 P.2d 997 (1976).
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Kuehner, the holding would have been in favor of the Washington
defendant. It seemed to me that the Washington court in that
case did what a civilized court ought to do.8 It concerned itself

with justice as between parties regardless of where they lived,
even to the extent of holding against the local boy. We can at least
recognize the difference in legal philosophy that appears in the
two cases, though we can like or dislike either of them.
I recognize that you (Professors Rosenberg and Juenger) interpret these New York cases somewhat differently than I do, and
you may be right as to their ultimate interpretation by the New
York Court of Appeals, but I am worried about whether other
courts, such as the Second Circuit, that attempt to follow
Neumeier, understand the cases as well as you do. I am thinking
of O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp.,9 a recent Second Circuit
case, in which the New York residence of the plaintiff's decedent
was given as a reason for applying New York's plaintiff-protective
torts law rather than Virginia's defendant-protective rule in an
action for a Virginia wrongful death. Reasonably intelligent
judges on other courts may not read the New York cases as narrowly, or as carefully, as you do.
II. DUE PROCESS: LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL JURISDICTION

One of the matters I was asked to comment on is the interrelation of legislative jurisdiction (the outer limits on choice of law)
and judicial jurisdiction (the power of a court to hear the case
against a particular defendant). The due process clause, of
course, controls both. In dealing with this matter, we should leave
out cases in which judicial jurisdiction is based on the defendant's domicile 10 or on service on a defendant while he is temporarily within the state." These are situations in which judicial
8. Washington's governmental interests, as they appeared from this opinion,
were those of a justice-dispensing court in a modem American state, a repository
of justice not only for the benefit'of home-state domiciliaries but for all litigants
who come before the court, even residents of distant states, and even against
local persons.
Leflar, supra note 6, at 19.
9. 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.J, cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 639 (1978). There were other New
York contacts, however, in addition to the decedent's residence, though the tort elements
were centered in Virginia.
10. E.g., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
11. E.g., Peabody v. Hamilton, 106 Mass. 217 (1870). This may well be the next
victim of the "fair play and substantial justice" limitation on judicial jurisdiction over
defendants. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 5, at 48.
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jurisdiction traditionally may be employed, yet in which legislative jurisdiction, that is, the application of the particular state's
substantive law to the foreign facts, would be completely impermissible under the due process clause, as in Home Insurance Co.
v. Dick, 2, and related cases.
The real question is the other side of the situation, in which
legislative jurisdiction does exist. Assuming an appropriate service statute, may judicial jurisdiction always be exercised by the
courts of a state that has sufficient contacts with the facts to
permit it to exercise legislative jurisdiction?13 We do not know a
firm answer to that question. What we do know is that judicial
jurisdiction and legislative jurisdiction have developed separately
in respect to the outer limits of what the due process clause permits. I suspect that for the practicing lawyer a fairly safe guide
would be that in almost any case in which a state has legislative
jurisdiction, a court of that state can exercise judicial jurisdiction
over a defendant who produced the situation to which that state's
law may permissibly be applied. In "almost" any such case, but
not in every such case?
In Hanson v. Denckla,41 which enforced due process limits on
the exercise of judicial jurisdiction, Chief Justice Warren issued
the warning: "For choice-of-law purposes such a ruling may be
justified, but we think it an insubstantial connection with the
trust agreement for purposes of determining the question of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant."' 5
A comparable intimation appears near the end of Justice
Marshall's prevailing opinion in Shaffer v. Heitner.16 The language in each instance is inconclusive. If the governing law on
separated substantive issues be that of different states, as by
d~pecage,' 7 it may be doubtful whether a defendant has sufficiently submitted himself to one or the other of the different
states to enable both of them to employ long-arm jurisdiction
over him in actions brought on the entire transaction. There may
12. 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
13. See Leflar, The Converging Limits of State JurisdictionalPower, 9 J. PUB. L. 282
(1960); Comment, At the Intersectionof Jurisdictionand Choice of Law, 59 CAUF. L. REV.
1514 (1971).
14. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).

15. Id. at 253.
16. 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977).
17. See Reese, Dkpecage: A Common Phenomenon in Choice of Law, 73 COLUM. L.
REV. 58 (1973).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol31/iss3/8

4

19801

Lefler: A Response from the Author
LEFLAR ON CONFLICTS

be contacts which, without ddpecage, satisfy the due process requirements of Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, but do not satisfy
InternationalShoe."5 An agreement of the parties, -for example,
that a particular state's law shall govern their transaction, may
be valid, yet not conclude the question of judicial jurisdiction.
There may even be constitutional limitations other than those
inherent in the due process clause that bear more on jurisdiction
than on choice of law.
A current decision in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit illustrates the latter possibility. In Hutson v.
Fehr Bros.,19 a plaintiff injured in Arkansas by the breaking of a
heavy log chain brought an action in that state with long-arm
service against the Italian manufacturer of the chain. Some
$74,000 worth of the defendant's chains had, over the years, been
sold in Arkansas, though by agents rather than by the defendant.
The four-to-three holding was against jurisdiction over the Italian
defendant. The opinion emphasized the inconvenience of such a
lawsuit, especially as it might interfere with foreign commerce.
Weissenfels [the Italian defendant] is burdened substantially
by having to defend this lawsuit. It must hire United States
counsel and support personnel and presumably transport its
witnesses to Arkansas from Italy in the event of trial. Naturally,
it will be strongly tempted to settle, even if it believes it is not
liable, because of the tremendous expense of trying the lawsuit,
an expense that bears far more heavily on it than on the other
[American] parties. 0
The intimation is that interference with foreign commerce, as
distinguished from a lesser interference with interstate commerce, might defeat otherwise permissible exercises of judicial
jurisdiction.
At any rate, there are some judicial jurisdiction questions
that are different from some legislative jurisdiction questions,
whether they arise under the due process clause or some other
18. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Kulko v. Superior
Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978), clarified somewhat the outer limits of judicial jurisdiction.
Further clarification is promised by the Supreme Court's noting probable jurisdiction and
ordering oral argument in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351 (Okla.
1978), prob. juris. noted, 99 S. Ct. 1212 (1979), in which the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
upheld long-arm service against a foreign corporation in an action brought on account of
Oklahoma product liability injuries suffered by the plaintiffs.
19. 584 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1978).
20. Id. at 837.
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clause of the Constitution. The two jurisdictional areas have been
coming closer together. What confers jurisdiction in one area will
usually confer it in the other. But they are certainly not yet
identical, and may never be.

III.

BASES FOR LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION

A closely related question is how substantial the factual contacts with a state must be in order for that state's substantive law
to be allowed to govern a transaction. That, of course, is the
problem of whether, under the due process clause, 2' legislative
jurisdiction can be sustained. Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 22 supplemented by a few later Supreme Court cases, 23 lays down the
basic requirement. The Constitution is violated if a court applies
to a legal issue the law of a state that has no substantial connecMarginal or far-out
tion with the facts that bear upon that issue.
24
suffice.
not
will
facts
the
contacts with
The question arises when a court attempts to apply the substantive law of a state whose only connection with the facts is that
the plaintiff is, or was, a resident of that state, when all other
elements in the transaction sued on were located or occurred in
other states. No United States Supreme Court decision has gone
that far.
It may be argued that Home Insurance Co. v. Dick itself
answered the question in the negative. Not quite. It is true that
in Dick the plaintiff was domiciled in Texas, and that was held
not to be enough, under the due process clause, to permit Texas
to apply Texas law to a contract made in Mexico, between Mexicans, for insurance on Mexican property. The Texas plaintiff had
21. Other constitutional clauses have been relied upon as controlling legislative jurisdiction. For a discussion of the application of the full faith and credit clause, see Martin,
ConstitutionalLimitationson Choice of Law, 61 CoRNELL L. REv. 185 (1976); Kirgis, The
Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in Choice of Law, 62 CoRNELL L. Rsv. 94
(1976) (a reply to Professor Martin's article); Martin, A Reply to Professor Kirgis, 62
CORNELL L. Rlv. 151 (1976). See also Horowitz, The Commerce Clause as a Limitation
on State Choice of Law Doctrine, 84 HAuv. L. Rav. 806 (1971); Note, Unconstitutional
Discriminationin Choice of Law, 77 COLUM. L. Ray. 272 (1977) (equal protection and
privileges and immunities clauses).
22. 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
23. E.g., Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964) (post-contract events are
relevant); Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955) (place of injury in tort).
24. On the inadequacy of marginal contacts, see Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction,78
COLUM. L. REV. 1587 (1978) (article not yet distributed at the time of the Chicago panel
program).
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not been a party to the original Mexican transaction, but was
only an assignee, though the assignment to him was made prior
to the loss. Would it have changed the result had he been a party
to the original Mexican transaction, perhaps then the owner of
the insured Mexican property? Or, assuming that it would not
have changed the result reached by a 1930 Supreme Court,"'
might it be deemed a sufficiently significant connecting factor by
the same Court in 1979 to permit application of the plaintiffs
domiciliary law?
I think this is the constitutional issue that underlies the
much-vexed question of whether New York's Seider v. Roth2 rule
is still valid. That rule permits garnishment in New York against
a nonresident tortfeasor's liability insurer which is doing business
(found) in New York, on claims arising from out-of-state torts
allegedly committed by out-of-state residents covered by out-ofstate liability insurance policies, provided the suing plaintiff is a
resident of New York. Prior to the 1977 decision in Shaffer v.
Heitner,2 the Seider v. Roth rule was supported by Harris v.
Balk28' which allowed such garnishments wherever the principal
defendant's debtor was found, but Shaffer overruled Harris v.
Balk. What is now left to sustain Seider v. Roth?
It has been asserted, both by the local courts2 9 and by commentators, 0 that the effect of the New York rule is the same as if
New York had a judicially created direct-action law, as does Florida,3" making a liability insurer directly liable, as on a third-party
beneficiary contract, to the tortiously injured person for whose
25. Cf. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934)
(superseded by subsequent decisions, e.g., Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179
(1964)).
26. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). Accord, Donawitz v.
Danek, 42 N.Y.2d 138, 366 N.E.2d 253, 397 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1977); Simpson v. Loehmann,
21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967). The Seider procedure was upheld
as constitutional in Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
844 (1969) and O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 99
S. Ct. 639 (1978).
27. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
28. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
29. See note 26 supra.
30. The most complete current attempt to sustain the Seider v. Roth rule appears in
Note, The Constitutionalityof Seider v. Roth after Shaffer v. Heitner, 78 CoLUM. L. Rav.
409 (1978).
31. Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969). See Note, JudicialCreation of
DirectActions Against Automobile Liability Insurers: Shingleton v. Bussey, 23 V~AD.L.
Rav. 631 (1970).
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benefit a liability policy normally operates. Clearly, it has that
substantive effect. For all practical purposes the New York rule
creates a new and separate cause of action against the insurance
company. But does New York have a sufficiently substantial
connection with the facts out of which the plaintiff's tort-contract
claim arises to permit that state to exercise this legislative
jurisdiction?
My problem is the permissible application of a substantive
New York direct-action rule to a set of facts that has practically
nothing to do with New York, where the injury occurred in another state, where the insurance policy was made in another
state, where the defendant comes from another state and only the
plaintiff comes from New York, and no other related state has a
direct-action rule. Can we agree to this, when the only basis for
applying the substantive law of New York is the fact that the
plaintiff is a resident or domicilary of that state?
The United States Supreme Court has upheld the constitutional applicability of direct-action statutes, 2 but only when the
injury itself occurred in the state or the liability insurance contract was made there. New York has entertained actions brought
on claims under the direct-action laws of some other state in
which the tortious injury was inflicted. 3 In these cases the new
direct cause of action was created by the law of a state that had
substantial contacts with the facts, more than just the plaintiff's
residence. Is the plaintiff's residence alone enough to enable New
York to create a substantive cause of action which exists under
the laws of no other connected state? That seems doubtful. 4
If that be enough, another constitutional question is then
presented, under the equal protection clause. It can at least be
argued that a rule which, without other justification, allows residents only, and not nonresidents, to bring direct actions against
insurers, denies to nonresident persons within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws. It may be hoped that, one of these
32. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
33. Oltarsh v. Aetna Ins. Co., 15 N.Y.2d 111, 204 N.E.2d 622, 256 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1965)
(action on Puerto Rican statutory direct action). See also Barrios v. Dade County, 310 F.
Supp. 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (action on Florida common-law direct action).
34. Of the American direct-action statutes, only that of Arkansas expressly authorizes direct actions when the only factual connection with the state is the plaintiff's residence. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3244 (1966). The validity of this enactment has not been
judicially tested.
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days, these constitutional questions will be authoritatively decided by the United States Supreme Court. 5
IV.

"FALSE CONFLICTS"

One of the panelists, I think it was Judge Todd, asked me to
comment on "false conflicts" as contrasted with "no conflict of
laws." Professor Brainerd Currie used the term "false conflicts"
extensively, and explained rather carefully what he meant by it.
He meant false conflicts of governmental interests. He said that
if one state had the sole governmental interest, or even far and
away the major governmental interest, in a particular transaction
and related matters, it was such a false conflict of governmental
interests that the state whose interests were the major ones
should apply its law, especially if it were the forum state.:6 That
did not, and he made it clear that it did not, mean that there was
no conflict of laws question in the case. Rather, it was a method
for resolving the choice-of-law issue that was clearly presented by
the case.
Professor Currie consistently said, and I think most of us
would agree with him, that if the sole contact of a particular
state, X, with a tort case was the fact that the accident occurred
in state X so that lex loci delicti could apply, this presented a real
conflict-of-laws case even though the parties all came from another state, started on a trip from the other state, and rode in an
auto registered in the other state, so that the governmental interests and the dominant contacts were centered in the other state.
It is a real conflict-of-laws case, because traditionally the law of
the place of the injury was applied. The due process clause permits the application of the lex loci delicti, even though most of
us would agree that the other state's law ought to govern some
issues at least. The term "false conflicts" as he used it was a clear
one, pointing out that the governmental interests involved in
such a case, insofar as they bore on the relationships of the parties
35. This hope may be approaching realization. The Supreme Court has noted probable jurisdiction and ordered oral argument in Savchuk v. Rush, 272 N.W.2d 888 (Minn.
1978), prob. juris. noted, 99 S. Ct. 1211 (1979), oral argument heard, Rush v. Savchuk,
48 U.S.L.W. 3238 (Oct. 9, 1979), in which the Supreme Court of Minnesota sustained its
Seider-type garnishment procedure on behalf of a plaintiff who became a Minnesota
resident only after he had been injured in Indiana.
36. B. CURI,

SELECTED EssAYs ON THE CONFuCT OF LAws 180, 183-84, 188-89, 203-

04, 590, 621, 627 (1963).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1980

9

South
Carolina
Law Review,
31, Iss. 3 [1980], Art.[Vol.
8
SOUTH
CAROLINA
LAWVol.
REVIEW
31

(guest statutes, intrafamily immunities, and the like), but not as
they bore on compliance with local "rules of the road," were
centered in the other state, so that its law ought to govern those
issues. On rules of the road, relating to the defendant driver's
alleged negligence, the governmental interests and dominant contacts were centered in the state where the car was being driven
37
at the time of the accident.
The term "false conflicts" has not always been understood
clearly because a lot of lawyers (not judges I hope) have thought
that it meant that there is no conflict of laws question to be
resolved. Of course, there is a conflicts question to be resolved.
The consideration of governmental interests, including the false
conflict of governmental interests, is just one way of resolving the
conflicts problem. We all know that, but the term was a bit misleading. At least, anything that misleads people is misleading,
isn't it?
The statement that there is "no conflict of laws" presented
by a given case means something else. I have preferred to use the
term "no conflicts" to describe situations in which, the law of two
states being the same, there is no conflict between the laws of the
two states. 8 We can go back to Dave Cavers' early writing for
clarification of this idea. 3 What we ought to be concerned with
is whether there is no real difference between laws, regardless of
plural or multiple jurisdictions. If the relevant laws of two states
are alike, there is no conflict between them and no need to make
a choice between their laws. That is a real meaning for the term
"no conflict of laws." My whole point is that Professor Currie's
term "false conflict" means something else; it refers to an approach to solving conflicts problems, not to denying their existence. I think that is something all of us know already, but we need
to emphasize it to our students.
Those are the conflicts areas that I have been specifically
asked to discuss this evening. I have touched them only briefly.
There are a lot of others, especially some that are raised by cur37. For Currie's reaction to such a case, Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191
N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963), see Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63
COLUM. L. REV. 1233 (1963). See generally Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New
York, 1963 DUKE L.J. 1.

38. Leflar, True "False Conflicts" et Alia, 48 B.U.L. REv. 164 (1968).
39. Cavers, A Critiqueof the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REv. 173, 178, 192
(1933). See also D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAw PRocEs 9, 79 (1965).
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rent cases, 4 that are equally interesting. I'm sorry we do not have
more time. Anyway, I appreciate your interest, what the other
panel members have said, and particularly Bob Felix's efficient
labors in arranging this entire-I hope useful-program. Thank
you!
40. See Leflar, Conflict of Laws, in 1979 ANN. SuRvay AM. L. 1. See, e.g., Gutierrez
v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979) (abandoning the old Texas disregard of Mexican
law and adopting a modem approach to choice of law in the torts area).
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